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Abstract 
This paper revisited Gregory Bateson’s theory of hierarchical learning through an experiment testing the 
existence of context effect and learning spill-over in two following games: a coordination game and a two-step 
battle-of-the sexes. The first part of the experiment is seen as a kind of training period. The different groups of 
the coordination game are, in fact, designed so to reinforce different representations of the games, requiring to 
look at different aspects of a series of images shown in the screen. The second game allows testing if differences 
in training determine different behaviors in a same situation. Our experiment suggests that the preliminary 
training influences how the second game is perceived. While the incentive structure of the battle-of-the sexes is 
not identical to the coordination game, the presence of an image determines a different kind of context similarity 
with the previous one. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The present paper aims at testing if a reinforced representation of a situation can 
influence subsequent choices in similar but not identical tasks. The experiment we 
performed studies the effect of the experience in playing two following games, 
namely a coordination game and a two steps battle of the sexes.  
In previous literature, there are few articles trying to investigate this kind of 
effect. In some previous articles investigating this kind of effect, different terms to 
explain how preliminary experiences can affect following behavior are used. In 
the managerial literature Levinthal and March (1993) use the expression “the 
myopia of learning”, focusing on the negative effect of experience, which in their 
view can sometimes be a bad teacher. Egidi and Narduzzo (1997) talk about path 
dependence in a complex organisational task; participants are trained with a 
specific configuration in a card game, and then play with a different one, requiring 
a new strategy. Camerer et al. (2000) show the transfer of precedent from two 
following games. Huck et al. (2007) study “learning spillover” (due to analogy 
based expectations) from different coordination games with a 3x5 matrix. With 
many differences, all of these analysis show that a strategy learned in a context 
can be transferred to a different one, namely to a different game or to a new 
problem, similar but not identical to a previous one. 
This paper proposes additional evidence on this transfer of strategies, starting 
from a theoretical representation of learning processes based on Bateson (1972). 
In his view, learning can be represented as a hierarchical process made of 
different steps. The possibility to use past knowledge is related to the capability to 
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perceive the similarity between a new context and another experienced in the past. 
At a first stage, agents adapt to their environment, through a trial-and-error 
process. The solution defined in such a process and the relation between stimuli 
and answers affects further learning steps. This strategy allows to take into 
account different aspects of learning, pointing out to the need of considering the 
strategies played, but also the representation of the situation. It also allows for 
reflecting on the relation between individual and environment. 
Traditional game theory predicts that equilibrium selection will converge on the 
unique Nash solution. In case of multiple equilibria, rational players will play a 
mixed strategy corresponding to a probability equal to 1/n strategies. But, 
“predicting which of many equilibria will be selected is perhaps the most difficult 
problem in game theory.” (Camerer 2003, p. 336). In fact, the “selection problem 
is essentially unsolved by analytical theory and will probably be solved only with 
a healthy dose of observation” (Camerer 2003, p. 336).  
For this purpose, in the construction of the experiment we considered learning 
processes, and in particular Gregory Bateson’s learning theory, presented in his 
book “Step to an ecology of the Mind” (1972), and we used images to create 
decisional frames. 
The problem of equilibrium selection has recently been analysed in coordination 
games under incomplete information conditions (Cabrales et al. 2007): plausible 
explanations of results converging on risk-dominant strategies have been the 
activation of a learning process in iterated games (Cabrales et al. 2007) and social 
learning mediated by higher status players whose choices tend to be imitated 
(Eckel et al. 2007). 
Batesons learning theory represents a theoretical reference useful for an 
interdisciplinary dialogue: in his work, he took in account both psychological and 
4 
biological insight in order to explain how people perceive a situation. Moreover, 
his model can be used to understand how a game can be represented by agents, 
according to their experience. Economists studied learning mainly in stable 
logical contexts, with given structures of material incentives: for instance, social 
learning models refer to the frequency of a particular response which tends to be 
imitated by other social actors in the same population in similar contexts (Bowles 
2004; Witt 2003) and cooperative iterated games are characterized by a Pareto-
dominant strategy which can be selected for a matter of “precedent” and 
“collective rationality” (Axerlod 1984), according to an evolutionary game 
theoretic account.  
Notwithstanding, in real-life interactions, contexts are not always stable and 
people make decisions in different kinds of situations at the same time. What 
happens in these cases can be understood considering Gregory Bateson’s learning 
theory. In his view, learning can be described as a hierarchical process involving 
different levels of change. Such levels can be better understood if compared to the 
laws of motion.  
“Zero learning” is the absence of motion, and it can be defined as the absence of 
change and stasis in decisions taken at different times. In some way, a “zero 
learning” is the result of already acquired knowledge which leads to a stable 
situation, in which a given context is responded to with a well-defined strategy or 
reaction. The subject can also give highly skilled responses for a particular 
context and he or she can have a set of already available alternatives which result 
particularly suitable to given situations, but the responses are fixed and, given the 
context, there is no correction or tendency towards change. In ordinary, non 
technical parlance, the word "learn" is often applied to what is here called "zero 
learning," i.e., to the simple receipt of information from an external event, in such 
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a way that a similar event at a later and appropriate time will convey the same 
information: “I learn from the factory whistle that it is twelve o'clock”. Each time 
that I will hear the factory whistle I will know that it’s twelve o’clock. I acquire 
this new piece of information, but nothing changed in my decisional strategy. 
Zero learning, then, can be defined as the absence of trial-and-error 
experimentation and it is characterized by “the simple acquisition of information” 
(Novarese, 2012, forthcoming). In particular, what Bateson defined as "zero 
learning" has been called by behavioral psychologists as conditioned stimulus-
response reaction or an operant. This is an habit, that can be defined as a model of 
repeated behavior resistant to change. Habits are also present in the literature of 
the "old" institutional economics (Veblen, 1899; Anderson, 1933).  The next step, 
“learning one”, is a change in the behavior practiced in zero learning: it is, in fact, 
a revision of choice in a given set of alternatives. “Learning one happens when  a 
new association is developed” (Novarese, ibidem) The change is, generally, 
adaptive and is characterized by a process of trial and error and a mechanism of 
comparison between new choices and previous strategies. Examples of learning 
one are the cases of instrumental reward and instrumental avoidance, when an 
agent learns to avoid a specific action in a give situation (in order, for example, to 
avoid blame). These models are typical of the Western philosophy based on free 
will, since prizes or punishments are due to the agents’ behavior and the same 
kind of interpretation is applied to economics, in which payoff or utility depends 
on the agents’ choices. 
The further step in Bateson’ theory is learning two. It determines a different and 
faster way to develop an action in order to deal with a new situation, based on a 
previous successful strategy. Learning one determines a specific segmentation, 
according to which an agent recognizes a context and then reacts to a stimulus by 
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using a given strategy. The same segmentation, that is a sequence of stimulus 
recognition and answer, can later be used in a different situation. This process 
leads to the creation of habits: a same approach is applied to solve an entire class 
of problems, which are seen as similar. Choices determined by instinct and 
genetic reactions belong to zero learning, as do pre-programmed responses 
derived from past learning. The player of a Von Neumannian game, by definition, 
is capable of all the computations necessary to solve whatever problems a game 
may present; they are incapable of not performing these computations whenever 
they are appropriate. Such a player receives information from the events of the 
game and acts appropriately upon that information. However, their learning is 
limited to what is here called zero learning (Bateson 1972, p. 284). 
A relevant difference between zero learning and learning one is that in the latter, 
at time t+1, an agent 1 behaves in a different way in respect to time t; because at 
time t+1 he has undertaken training. Moreover, he behaves differently from an 
agent 2, who was trained in a different setting or has not been trained. 
For this reason, in the definition of learning one, there is an implicit definition of 
context: the stimulus is somehow the same at time t and t+1, and this notion of 
sameness delimits the notion of context as well, which must be the same in both 
periods. Without this assumption of repeatable contexts there could just be zero 
learning. Having a repeatable context is necessary for allowing any kinds of 
learning, as here defined. If the context changes every time, no learning (one) can 
occur. Every situations would be different from the others and experience could 
not be gathered and used.
. 
Yet, this fact makes it necessary to define when agents 
perceive to be in a same given context. There should be some kind of context 
marker informing the agent. In particular, “we may regard context as a collective 
term for all those events which tell the organism among what set of alternatives he 
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must make the next choice” (Bateson 1972, p. 289). Context markers can activate 
a specific process of segmentation, that is the ability to recognize the stimuli to 
react to. The process of segmentation is the particular and subjective perception of 
external reality; it is the way we perceive a situation as punctuated with a 
particular sequence of stimuli and choices. 
Following this interpretation, a context is considered as the set of all possible 
elements that characterize a situation as a specific one. This is recognizable by all 
those who share the same perception of the fundamental elements that determine 
the situation in this specific way. Given the information of the context marker, 
agents know how to react to a given stimulus. Such stimulus can be seen as an 
elementary signal. The context marker represents a meta-signal which defines 
how the stimulus has to be read. An organism could, in fact, respond, to the same 
stimulus differently in different contexts. When the agent learns to react to the 
stimulus, they also learn to classify the meta-signal and to define a context and 
then to make a given choice. 
Defining how an agent acts in a given context is easier in a mathematical or 
logical world where specific structures make the contexts stable, like in standard 
game theory. Standard economics and game theory do not need this richer 
representation as they are based on the idea that people react just to the 
mathematical representation of a situation, based on the material incentive. 
Contexts do not matter. The problem arises when the analysis is brought into 
reality or tries to be more realistic, and the logical structure is enriched with data, 
variables, information: this is exactly what we try to do in our experiment, passing 
from a pure logical game to a richer representation of the reality. 
Bateson’s multi-steps concept of learning can also be read in the light of Friedrich 
Hayek’s, between information and knowledge (Hayek, 1937). The first can be described 
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as the objective data while knowledge is the individual representation of that external 
signal. In Hayek's view, the process of knowledge development requires a 
continuous adaptation to the environmental conditions that humans face and is 
context-dependent. Each rule of behaviour is general because it is abstract and it 
can be applied in several contexts, but at the same time it is strongly local 
because, once it has been applied, it depends on the environmental cues triggered 
by a specific condition and on the individual interpretations given to these cues.  
So, because of the difference in individual experience, a same information is 
perceived in a different way. Given a same signal, different reactions will follow. 
Experimental economics is able to recreate in the laboratory these conditions 
(Tversky et al. 1981; Smith, 2008), showingthe relevance of a different kind of 
frames and incentives as agents react to different variables. The model proposed 
by Bateson helps in understandingg how strategies and decisions need to be 
related to a specific frame, in order to use the past experience. All situations 
which are perceived as resolvable with a same kind of strategy can now be 
defined as similar, as both learning one or two might intervene. Because of 
learning two, different situations (as different games) can be managed with the 
same strategy. The use of an image to create a context, is consistent with the 
“labelling” processes which has been started by Schelling’s work on focal points 
(Schelling 1960): the way in which strategies are described and perceived can 
influence choices and the expectations players formulate on them. Our image 
allows to create a kind of frame: so our experiment can be related to the stream of 
research which investigates how differences in the game’s presentation to the 
players can determine different choices (Hoffman et al.1994; Mehta et al.1994; 
Sugden 1995; Larrick et al. 1997; Camerer 1998; Warglien et al. 1999; Hoffman 
et al. 2000, Sugden et al. 2006). However, the originality of the present research 
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rests on studying the influence of the first game on the second, testing the viability 
of Bateson’s hierarchical learning theory. 
This particular interpretation is a key point in order to understand our laboratory 
experiment and seems to find a plausible application in field experiments as well, 
like those run in different small scale societies (Henrich 2000; Henrich et al. 
2001). In these experiments it emerged that subjects play experimental 
“laboratory” games according to rules and models of the world that shape their 
ordinary social and private life. For instance, people can refuse very high offers in 
a ultimatum game because they are motivated by a sense of honour and 
obligation: if they are accepting the offer now, they will have to pay back a higher 
offer in the future. This example explains how the same game and the same kind 
of situation can have different meanings and can be subjected to different kind of 
interpretations, according to the values, cultural practices and habits that a 
particular member of a population can have. It also shows how the same person 
can find similarities between different situations, behaving according to the same 
representation. 
 
2. Methods 
 
2.1 Participants 
We enrolled seventy students, attending their first year at the Faculty of Law. 
They had no prior background in behavioral economics. We divided them in three 
groups: a total of 24, 18, 28 subjects participated in the first, second and third 
group respectively. Each subject took part only to the experimental condition 
corresponding to its group. Each group participate first to a coordination game 
(turns 1 to 18) and then to a two-steps battle of the sexes game (turn 19-27). 
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Players were paid according to their payoffs: each point gained was exchanged for 
0.07 cents of Euros.  
2.2 Procedure 
We conducted an experiment of two parts: the first is a coordination game, that 
was characterized by three different conditions corresponding to three different 
group of participants; the second is a two-step battle-of-the sexes game, that was 
the same for all the seventy participants. A computer randomly and anonymously 
paired up subjects in the lab. These couples remained unchanged throughout the 
experiment. In each turn, subjects were shown both their own and their partner’s 
choices and payoffs. 
2.2.1. The Coordination Game  
The first part of the experiment was a coordination game, played by three 
different groups. In each turn subjects had to pick one word between two possible 
alternatives. Words in this double-choice option represent written numbers (for 
example “four; five”). Along with the two words subjects were shown an image. 
The images appearing next to the decision options represented a set of two 
numbers in Arabic characters. Each of them was represented in several point of 
the images either in scattered orders or followed some precise patterns. The 
images could either present both the numbers in the double-choice option or just 
one of them and another one that was not presented in the double-choice. One of 
the two numbers was drawn more frequently. For instance, when subjects had to 
coordinate in choosing one word out of "five" and "four", an image with "5" and 
"4" in Arabic characters was presented (see figure 1, used at round seven) and the 
"5" occurred more frequently in the image. In another round, when subjects 
needed to coordinate in choosing between "four" and "eight", an image with "8" 
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and "7" in Arabic characters was presented, and the "8" occurred more frequently 
(see figure 2, used at round 1). In every round both words and image changed.  
Numbers appeared at random on the screen of each player and they might not be 
visualized in the same order for each of them. So what was seen as the first 
number for player one, could be the second for player two. The picture appearing 
next to the words was the same. 
Figure 1 
 
Figure 2 
 
We ran three groups, with different payoff structure of the game.  
In the first group,  subjects got a higher payoff when picking the same number. In 
the instructions there was no direct reference to the image as a possible tool for 
coordinating. Yet, obviously, the picture was supposed to play a fundamental role, 
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as it seemed to be the easier way to coordinate. Subjects could learn to choose the 
word of the most frequent number in the picture, or even the opposite one. They 
could just look at the image and find the most focal number (generally, but not 
always, the most frequent). Table 1 shows a matrix referring to this treatment. 
Choosing the same number allowed subjects to score points. The important thing 
for paired subjects is achieving coordination, regardless on which number. This is 
the reason why in the following matrix we simply refer to “number A” and 
“number B”. 
Table 1. Pay-off matrix for the first group 
P1/P2 Choose number A Choose number B 
Choose number A (6,6) (0,0) 
Choose number B (0,0) (6,6) 
 
In the second group the numbers to be chosen and the image appearing next to the 
text were the same as in the previous treatment, but in order to score points, 
subjects were not just supposed to pick the same number; they both had to choose 
the lowest one. In other cases each of them obtained zero points. Here the images 
were the same as for the first group. The game was characterized by imperfect 
information: players just knew that they would obtain a zero payoff when their 
choice were different. The instructions just said that if they both picked a same 
specific number (without specify that has to be the lowest one) they would have 
obtained a reward. The instructions also said that the winning number could be 
inferred as it followed a specific rule. Table 2 shows the implicit payoff matrix for 
this game.  
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Table 2. Pay-off matrix for the second group 
P1/P2 Choose the lowest 
number 
Choose the highest 
number 
Choose the lowest 
number 
(6,6) (0,0) 
Choose the highest 
number 
(0,0) (0,0) 
 
In the third group each of the player scored six points if both of them choose the 
lowest number; but each time coordination was achieved by following the wrong 
rule (i.e, the highest number) both players scored a negative payoff of minus 
seven. In absence of any coordination, both of them score zero points. Here the 
image were again the same of the treatment one and two. Players could not infer 
this from the instructions: the game was characterized by information 
withholding, so that they had to figure out the payoff structure of the game while 
playing. In this treatment the instructions said that the score depended on the 
choices of both players and that they could either win or lose a same amount of 
money. Table 3 shows the implicit payoff matrix. 
Table 3. Pay-off matrix for the third group 
P1/P2 Choose the lowest 
number 
Choose the highest 
number 
Choose the lowest 
number 
(6,6) (0,0) 
Choose the highest 
number 
(0,0) (-7,-7) 
 
Summing up, in the first group, following just the image was the simplest way to 
obtain coordination; in the second and in the third groups however it was not 
sufficient, since coordination had to happen on the lowest number and the image 
did not give information about this. Moreover, while in the second treatment, a 
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coordination on the highest numbers gave zero point, in the third one, it gave a 
loss of seven points. Therefore we considered each of the three different groups as 
a different kind of possible training before playing the two-steps battle of the 
sexes. Our aims is to observe the different effects of each of them on the second 
game. In the fist group looking at the image should be reinforced, while in the 
others it should not. 
2.2.2 The battle-of-the sexes game 
The second part of the experiment (turns 19 up to 27) was a two-step battle-of-the 
sexes game. This part of the experiment was the same for all seventy subjects. It 
was built up as an ultimatum game, since paired players can be either proposer or 
receiver. Their roles were randomly selected by the computer at the beginning of 
the second part (i.e. at turn 19). Differently from an ultimatum game, proposers 
could not make their own personal offer, because they had to choose between two 
different possible amounts only. Again, at each round, players were shown an 
image. The images used in this game were similar to those of the first game. Each 
turn of the game was, therefore, characterized by a choice among two numbers 
and by the appearance of an image. The first player had to pick one of the two 
numbers presented in a double-choice option. The first player's proposal was 
communicated to the second one who had to accept it or not. Receivers were 
aware of the possible payoffs and the alternative decisions available and saw the 
same image as the proposers. If the first number again expressed as a word was 
selected and the receiver approved it, the proposer got a payoff of seven and the 
second player a score of five. Otherwise, if the second number (expressed as a 
word) was selected and approved, the proposer got five points and the second 
player obtained seven. If the proposal was not accepted both players got zero 
points.  
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Table 4. List of all numbers in the  double-choice alternative for each group 
Turn 1st choice 2nd choice MFN 
1 Four eight eight 
2 Three six three 
3 One two one 
4 Two four two 
5 Seven fourteen seven 
6 Four eight four 
7 Four five five 
8 Three seven three 
9 Four nine nine 
10 One eight eight 
11 One two one 
12 Two seven two 
13 Eight nine nine 
14 Two three three 
15 Five seven five 
16 Four nine four 
17 Three nine nine 
18 Five eight eight 
19 Two four four 
20 One two two 
21 Three seven seven 
22 Four eight eight 
23 Four nine nine 
24 Three six three 
25 Two five two 
26 Two seven two 
27 Two four two 
 
Table 4 shows the list of choices for each turns in all the experiment: the last 
column indicates the most frequent number in the picture of that round. In the 
following analysis we will divide the battle-of-the sexes in two periods: from 
turns 19 up to 23 (we call this the third period, just to avoid using the adjective 
first and second, assigned here to the two games), and from turns 24 up to 27 (i.e., 
the fourth period). While in the third period the lowest number in the two-choices 
option and the most frequent number in the image did not coincide, in the fourth 
period they did. 
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2.3. Data Analysis 
Both Anova and Krustal- Walliss non parametric test were conducted to test  
statistical significance of results. 
2.4. Results 
During the first game, players in group one learnt to play the most frequent 
number in the image more than the others players. In fact, players had to achieve 
coordination in order to obtain a positive payoff, regardless on which number. 
Therefore, they would be motivated to look at the image in order to choose the 
most (or least) frequent number in the image also in the battle-of-the sexes game 
more often than players in the other groups. Instead of just looking for the egoistic 
choice (or for an altruistic one) they would be influenced by the image. Therefore 
a learning spill-over process happened between the first and the second game.  
The training effects on the battle of the sexes for the second and third groups was 
different. While in the first group it is plausible that players learnt to choose the 
most  frequent number in the image, in the other two treatments this behavior was 
not rewarded and the image did not gave good hints.  Even if players did not 
understand the correct rule (pick the lowest number), the rule "pick the most 
frequent number" was not reinforced. For this reason the image did not became a 
focal point. In Bateson’s word, the segmentation “look at the image, and then 
chose the word” was not reinforced in the first game and could not be applied to 
the second. Players from the first group were more influenced by the image and, 
consequently, selected different equilibria in part three and four of the battle of the 
sexes: the word “equilibria” is used when first players’ proposals was accepted by 
the receivers, while “proposals” indicates offers which can be either accepted or 
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not accepted
 
In fact, in part three, the second choice (the less profitable for the 
proposer) was the one referring to the most frequent number. In part four, there 
was an opposite situation as the first word referred now to the most frequent 
number. Since players are influenced by the first game of the experiment, and so 
they followed the image, in part three, proposers obtained lower scores than 
receivers. For the same reason, in part four, proposers obtained higher rewards. 
Instead, for groups two and three, the differences in the result of the third and 
fourth parts of the battle of the sexes were less accentuated. In fact, in these 
groupsts, players did not learn to look at the most frequent number in the image 
with the same intensity as in the first group. 
Since in the first treatment there was a clearly reinforced strategy of the kind 
“pick the word of the most frequent number”, this same strategy was applied also 
in the second game, with an higher frequency than in the other treatments. So first 
group agents spontaneously looked at the second game as if it were a natural 
extension of the first. Therefore in the first group there were more proposals and 
equilibria on the word corresponding to the most frequent number. This happened 
even if in the part three of the game the proposer won less than the receiver, 
selecting the most frequent number in the image, and in the part four, receiver 
won less than proposer accepting the choice of the most frequent number. This 
effect at the individual level was less pronounced in the other two groups. 
 
3. Discussion 
 
The goal of our experiment is to find out if and how the experience acquired in the 
first game influences the choices made in the second one. For this purpose, the 
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first and the second games of the experiment have been made up with some 
similarities. A first analogy between the two games is that both of them can be 
considered and perceived as coordination game. In fact, the battle-of-the sexes has 
been classified by Camerer (2003) as a coordination game even if it is 
characterized by divergent rather than common interests. The second analogy is 
the presence of an image in both game, and more in general, the presence of 
similar visualizations and tasks in the two games. These analogies could make 
possible that the coordination game of the experiment works as a training which 
possibly affects choices in the two-step battle-of-the sexes game. 
Our game is then linked to the vast literature on learning, signal detection and 
stimulus discrimination and differential responding . 
The first part of the experiment, namely the coordination game, according with 
Bateson’s theory of learning one, developed a situation in which the same type of 
behavior has been either reinforced (in group one) or punished (in group two). 
Given the complexity of the images, participants had to figure out a focal point 
(i.e. the most frequent number) from other distraction elements, which may 
suggest to achieve coordination with the partner (and then the equilibrium) 
following a different strategy. The experiment allowed then to test how the focal 
point selected in the first game (i.e. the coordination game) has been detected and 
used again in the second part of the game, i.e. the two-steps battle of the sexes 
In particular, we identified at least three possible ways to perceive the game and 
the influences between the coordination and the battle of the sexes game: 
- rational choice; player one chooses the most convenient number for herself 
counting up on the acceptance of the player two. In this case, player one won 
more than player two; 
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- fair choice; players one and two split up the points, alternating the choice of the 
first number with the one of the second. In this case, both players won the same 
amount;  
- path dependent choice; the choices depended on the image, since the players 
learned to follow the image in the first game of the experiment
1
. In this case, 
players did not follow a personal reward. They rather choose following the 
images.  
By applying the model proposed by Bateson (1972), given the similarities in the 
problems to be solved, we could expect some kind of inertia between behaviors in 
the two games, but only if players developed a reinforced strategy in the first one. 
This is, in fact, a key point. 
Both Bateson’s learning one and two are relevant. Learning one suggests that in a 
given context, signaled by a context marker, agent should learn to perform a same 
choice. The problem consists in fixing a context. As in the real world there are no 
two identical situations, in our experiment the first game and the second one are 
not identical. Learning two shows that agents can apply classed of solutions in 
different problems, and in this way reduce the need for a precise definition of the 
context, that can be seen as a situation where a same action can be performed and 
eventually reinforced. Contexts need also to be shared and recognized, so there 
should be some signal able to trigger a specific strategy. A strategy reinforced in 
the first game, could then also be applied in the second one. 
In the second game, the most profitable option for the first player is to choose the 
first number (rational choice). In this way, he obtains seven point, if the second 
                                                 
1
Accordingly with an idea of the acquisition of knowledge as a path-dependence process (Rizzello, 
2004) 
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player accepts: according to the rational choice, the second player should accept, 
and win five instead of refusing and win zero. Notwithstanding, the second player 
could be willing to refuse this offer if it was perceived as unfair. The proposer 
could, therefore, react to this threat by accepting to win five point, or to alternate 
offers. A similar behavior could be expected by assuming the hypothesis of 
fairness. We did not neglect any of these possible effects. Yet our contention was 
that the decision would be related also to the group in which the first game was 
played and to the relevant experience acquired by the subjects. 
Figure 3 gives a first idea of the mean payoff for the first player
2
 for each group 
during the whole experiment (the first game ends at round 18).  
In the first game the highest mean payoff was almost always achieved by the first 
group, as expected, since coordination was easier. A fast learning process can be 
observed here: from the fourth turn the percentage of subjects who coordinated 
with their partner increased and remained stable. It is evident that the image 
acquired a real powerful role: even though the players were not told about the 
need to find out a rule in order to coordinate, they might have related to the image 
and the most frequent number depicted in it suddenly became their focal point. 
Coordination in group two and three was more difficult: players won a lower 
mean payoff than players in the first treatment. In those treatments, the most 
frequent number in the image could still be the most focal one from a visual point 
of view, but this time the game was built upon a very specific rule, that is 
“coordinate on the lowest number”. This rule seemed to be difficult to identify. 
The image was too strong and captured players' attention. 
                                                 
2
 Obviously the earnings of the two coupled players in the second game are highly dependent. So 
we decided to focus our analysis mainly on the first one. The mean payoff in the first game were 
identical for both players, since they won the same payoff in each turn. 
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Figure 3. 
 
In order to compare how coordination took place in the different groups, Table 5 
shows the percentage of choice of the most frequent number for each group. A 
number could be either the most or the least frequent; in a single round a player 
can appear to choose an option just by accident. In other words: the lowest 
number could be chosen, but this could also be the most frequent. So an external 
observer might not understand the decision criteria. Looking at the decisions taken 
in many following rounds, we eliminated this problem as, throughout the game, 
the lowest number was independent from the most frequent. A slightly different 
and more reliable indicator of the same attitude is the sequence of turns in which 
any couple of players chose the word corresponding to the most frequent number 
(or to the lowest one)
3
. 
                                                 
3
 Let us consider, for instance, the first five rounds. Let us imagine that a couple selects the most 
frequent number at round three, four and five. It is possible to define a variable called repetition 
whose value is equal to zero in the first three rounds, while afterwords it takes the values one and 
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In the first group the percentage of choice of the most frequent number and of the 
sequences of choices were higher. Groups two and three failed to understand their 
optimal coordination rule. So their percentage of choice of the lowest number was 
not higher than that of the first group. 
Figure 3 shows also the mean payoff of players one in the second game. If we 
look at the first treatment, we understand that mean payoffs in the rounds from 24 
to 27 were higher than the ones in rounds from 19 to 23. In the last five rounds 
there was a clear increase in this value. For the other two groups the picture was 
quite less clear. Especially for the third group, there seemed to be no difference 
between what we called part three and part four of the second game. Table 5 
allows a better analysis of the differences between groups, showing a series of 
indicators and two significance tests. 
In the third period of the first group, players one often offered the less profitable 
number for themselves (the word proposed corresponding to the most frequent 
number - i.e. the second one - was higher for this group, even though the 
difference is not very significant). Notwithstanding, they obtained the highest 
mean payoff, with respect the other two groups. This can occur because the first 
group is characterized by the lowest offers’ rejection rate, and, then, by the 
highest number of equilibria.  
                                                                                                                                     
two. We can compute a mean value for the given period and couple of this variable and divide it 
by five. In this way we have an indicator of the tendency to repeat a same choice in a given period. 
If a same choice is repeated by a same couple of players it is less probably a random choice. Using 
this index, we found the same tendency shown in table 5. Treatment one had the highest mean 
value (0.29 while treatment two had and index equal to 0.09 and treatment three had a value equal 
to 0.10). 
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Table 5. Choice of the most frequent and lowest number in the coordination game: mean values 
per treatment 
 
Treatment 
1 
Treatment 
2 
Treatment 
3 
KW 
p-value 
Test t 
p-value 
Percentage of choice on the 
most frequent number 0.88 0.66 0.68 0.000** 0.000** 
Percentage of choice on the 
lowest number 0.55 0.53 0.52 0.490 0.382 
 
Table 6 shows that data about equilibria on the most frequent number, for the first 
group, are statistically significant both in period three and period four with a 
parametric and non parametric test. Proposers from the first group choose the 
most frequent number 72% of the times and the proposals made were accepted 
68% of the times. Instead, in groups two and three, the first players were more 
likely to choose proposals which were the most profitable for themselves but not 
for the second player, and their proposals were more likely to be rejected as well: 
proposal for the most frequent number were 56% and 60% respectively in period 
three of the second and third treatments, while equilibria on the most frequent 
number decreased with respect the first treatment, being 35% and 42% 
respectively. 
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Table 6. Mean Values for some indexes in the battle-of-the sexes, player one. 
Index 
Treatment 
1 
Treatment 
2 
Treatment 
3 
KW 
p-value 
Test t 
p-value 
Proposals for the word 
corresponding to the most 
frequent number, period 3 0.72 0.56 0.60 0.125 0.094 
Proposals for the word 
corresponding to the most 
frequent number, period 4  0.83 0.67 0.57 0.023* 0.019* 
Equilibria on the proposals 
of the word corresponding 
to the most frequent 
number, period 3   0.68 0.35 0.42 0.003** 0.001** 
Equilibria on the proposals 
of the word corresponding 
to the most frequent 
number, period 4 0.79 0.56 0.41 0.001** 0.000** 
DIFF3 -0.36 -0.15 -0.15 0.231 0.201 
DIFF4 0.65 0.28 0.04 0.003** 0.001** 
DDIFF 1.01 0.43 0.19 0.010* 0.003** 
Mean payoff for couples, 
period 3 5.08 3.56 3.40 0.000** 0.000** 
Mean payoff for couples, 
period 4  5.63 5.00 4.71 0.119 0.159 
Percentage of choices’ 
confirmation for identical 
images between the 
coordination and the two 
steps battle-of-the-sexes 
(turns 1-22; 4-27; 9-23; 12-
26)  0.71 0.50 0.54 0.034* 0.022* 
 
The first group was characterized by the highest frequency of choices on the most 
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frequent number: this datum can be seen by looking at the mean difference in the 
payoff among player one and player two in each pairs of subjects. We call this 
variable DIFF, which is computed as: 
 
mean value over all t, of: first player’s payoff in turn t- pair’s of subjects mean 
payoff in turn t. 
 
If DIFF is negative, this means that the proposer’s payoff is lower than receiver’s. 
If, for example, a proposer always picks the first number (winning 7 points, while 
the receiver gets 5), DIFF is equal to 1. An opposite behaviour would determine a 
value equal to -1. Data in table 7 shows that in period three, proposers in all 
treatments won a lower mean payoff than the second player, as they offered many 
times the second word. The mean value of DIFF
 
3
4
 was lower for the first 
treatment, but the difference was not significant from the other groups. In period 
four, all treatments jumped to a positive value of DIFF4, but now the first one had 
a significantly higher value. In treatment three, DIFF4 is almost equal to 0: there 
were virtually no differences between the two players. While in the first group in 
most cases proposers picked the first number and receivers accepted it, in group 
three players shared the points almost equally and therefore behaved as if they 
were not relying so much on the most frequent object in the image. 
The variable DDIFF measures the differences between DIFF in period four and DIFF 
in period three. Group one had the highest difference in DDIFF between the two 
periods. This is consistent with our prediction: players who had been used to look 
at the most frequent number in the image kept on doing so at a greater extent than 
                                                 
4
 In Table 6 we defined as DIFF3 and DIFF4 the value corresponding to DIFF in period three and 
period four respectively. 
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others. 
The inertia between the two games can be tested in another way. Four images had 
been presented in the coordination game and were then repeated in the second 
part. Players in the first group showed the greatest consistency, confirming the 
same choices in the two situations. The first group showed, moreover, the longest 
sequence of choices on the most frequent number, in both parts of the game, as 
they showed highest values for the same kind of decision in the first game. 
Table 7. An analysis at the individual level: some correlation coefficients between choices in the 
two games 
 tr 1 tr 2 tr 3 
Correlation coefficient between the 
score in the first part of the game and 
the frequency of seven got in the 
second part by the first player in the 
third part of the game 
-0.42 
(0.09) 
0.30 
(0.31) 
-0.26 
(0.23) 
Correlation coefficient between the 
score in the first part of the game and 
the frequency of seven got in the 
second part by the first player in the 
fourth part of the game 
0.41 
(0.10) 
0.59 
(0.05) 
-0.27 
(0.21) 
 
The link between the behavior in the two games can be detected also at an 
individual level. In the first treatment, a well defined behavior is reinforced. 
Players who learn to pick the most frequent number got an higher score and 
developed a stronger tendency to look at the image in the same way also in the 
second game. This same attitude was only partially reinforced in the second group 
and is not reinforced at all in the third one. 
The correlation coefficient between the score in the first part of the game and the 
frequency of number seven got in the second part by the first player in the third 
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part of the game was negative and significant for the first group: first players who 
understood in a better way the game in the first part got a lower score in part three 
and an higher one in part four. In the third group this coefficient was not 
significantly different from zero. So there was no such correlation where picking 
the highest number was not reinforced. In the second treatment (where picking the 
highest number where partially reinforced) the correlation was found just when it 
was convenient for the proposer. The same behavior is maintained in the two 
games only if it were initially reinforced. 
 
4. Conclusions 
 
This paper aimed at proposing new evidence on learning transfer from different 
contexts, starting from some insights proposed by Gregory Bateson (1972). This 
topic is not new in the literature, but it is quite neglected, so further evidence is 
needed to understand both its importance and field of application. Moreover, there 
is mainly the need of a general framework for modeling this phenomenon in order 
to understand when it occurs and which effect it determines. Among other 
possibilities, the steps based learning idea proposed by Bateson seems to be quite 
useful. First of all, it is quite general, as it can be applied to study both game 
theory and other decision settings. It helps, besides, in understanding the adaptive 
origin of the transfer of learning. It shows both the positive and negative elements 
of learning. It highlights the link between decisions and the environment and the 
problem of fixing an environmental context. It shows how the same environment 
can be perceived in different ways, because of different social reinforcement 
based on a selection of the information. This model makes it clear how in the real 
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world agents need first of all to define in which decision context they are, 
screening all the variables and selecting some of them. Economics usually models 
human being as just interested to monetary incentives. So all other information 
can be excluded from analysis. The experimental literature showed that agents 
react also to other variables, as information. Therefore, studying how information 
is selected becomes a necessary task. The idea of context and context marker can 
help in understanding how this selection can occur and how apparently not 
relevant variables can be used because of learning. Bateson shows that this 
process can happen because of the same adaptation process (and therefore because 
of ecological rationality).  
In our experiment, the firs group generates a reinforcement of the strategy played 
in the first game. This strategy is maintained in the second game, while a possible 
perception of similarities seems to be weaker, or at least different, in the other 
groups.  
The strategy based on choosing the word of the most frequent element reinforces 
also the role of the image. The image is then the context marker, while the most 
frequent object is the variable used for picking a word. Players learnt to look at 
the image, searching for specific information. In the other groups there is no 
shared information able to allow an easy coordination, as shown by the lower 
capacity to reach equilibrium. The only shared strategy could be a common 
expectation of the difficulty in getting a positive payoff. Sharing a rule can be, in 
a social context, good even if such a rule is not direct to increase the payoff of a 
single agent in a individualist way. The overall better performance in the first 
group can therefore be explained by a common representation of the game, 
lacking in the other groups. In this experiment, learning two therefore can be seen 
as adaptive, because it allows for a common view of the game: in this game, 
29 
learning two is the capacity to apply a same strategy to two different games. If we 
consider the proposer, fit of decision depends on the reply of the second player, 
and if the second player refuses choices different from the ones used in the first 
game, the two games can be seen as a unique context. Therefore, the altruistic 
strategy developed in this game is just the result of the representation of the game 
itself and even a demonstration of rationality. Given receivers’ behavior, picking 
the less profitable word in period three can be seen as a rational strategy. 
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Appendix A: Instructions for the first part of the game 
The instructions for the three treatments are reported below. In the original 
version of the experiment they were written in Italian. The English translation 
reported here is as faithful as possible. 
 
Instructions for the first group: 
You are supposed to fill in the next page with your first name and last name. Once 
you will click on the start button, the game will start with a certain number of 
turns. Throughout the duration of the experiment, the computer will pair you with 
another person in the lab, anonymously and randomly chosen. Your partner will 
be the same throughout the experiment. In each turn, each of you will see the 
same image and the same list of two words. The words will be the same for each 
member of the pair, but their order may be different between the partners because 
is randomly generated by the computer in a different way for each player. Each of 
you has to choose a word. If you choose the same word, both of you will be 
awarded with 6 experimental points; if the options chosen are different, you will 
not score any points for that turn. You are not allowed to communicate in any 
way. In each turn you have three minutes of time to make your choice. After you 
have chosen, the computer shows the choices that you both made and the payoff 
results for both of you.  
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Instructions for the second group: 
You are supposed to fill in the next page with your first name and last name. Once 
you will click on the start button, the game will start with a certain number of 
turns. Throughout the duration of the experiment, the computer will pair you with 
another person in the lab, anonymously and randomly chosen. Your partner will 
be the same throughout the experiment. In each turn, each of you will see the 
same image and the same list of two words. The words will be the same for each 
member of the pair, but their order may be different between the partners because 
is randomly generated by the computer in a different way for each player. Each of 
you has to choose a word. If you both make the same choice selecting the word 
that fulfills a particular criterion, you will both obtain 6 experimental points. If 
partners make different choices, they will not score points in that turn. You are not 
allowed to communicate in any way. If you make different choices or you select 
the wrong word, you will both get zero payoff. The word that makes you win 6 
points follows a specific logic that can be inferred while playing. 
 
Instructions for the third group: 
You are supposed to fill in the next page with your first name and last name. Once 
you will click on the start button, the game will start with a certain number of 
turns. Throughout the duration of the experiment, the computer will pair you with 
another person in the lab, anonymously and randomly chosen. Your partner will 
be the same throughout the experiment. In each turn, each of you will see the 
same image and the same list of two words. The words will be the same for each 
member of the pair, but their order may be different among the partners because is 
randomly generated by the computer in a different way for each player. Each of 
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you has to choose a word. The payoff in each turn depends on the choice you both 
made. According to your choices, you could win or lose experimental points. The 
points won or lost are identical for both of you. You are not allowed to 
communicate in any way. 
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Appendix B: Instructions for the second part of the game 
Instructions in case the computer has randomly determined that you are 
player one 
At this time the game has changed. A player one and two have been determined, 
randomly, by the computer: you are player one.  
You are still paired with the same player as in the first part of the game: pairs will 
remain unchanged throughout the experiment. 
You have to make a choice in the following double-choice options. Your choice 
will be transmitted at player two, who can see the same image and words as you. 
Player two can either accept or refuse the proposal made. If you choose the first 
number in the double-choice options, and player two accepts it, you will win 7 
experimental points, and he or she will win 5 experimental points. If player two 
refuses, you will both win zero payoff. If you choose the second number in the 
double-choice option, instead, and if player two accepts it, you will win 5 
experimental points and he or she will win 7 experimental points. If player two 
refuses the offer made, you will both get a zero payoff. You have three minutes to 
make a decision for each trial. 
 
Instructions in case the computer has randomly determined that you are 
player two 
At this time the game has changed. A player one and two have been determined, 
randomly, by the computer: you are player two.  
You are still paired with the same player as in the first part of the game: pairs will 
remain unchanged throughout the treatments. 
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Player one has just chosen a word from the double-choice options (he or she can 
see the same words and numbers as you). You can accept or refuse his or her 
offer. If player one’s proposal corresponds to the first number in the double-
choice option, and you accept it, player one will win 7 experimental points, and 
you will win 5 experimental points. If you refuse it you will both obtain zero 
payoff. If player one’s proposal, instead, corresponds to the second number in the 
double-choice option, and you accept the offer, you will win 7 experimental 
points, and player one will win 5 experimental points. If you refuse, you will both 
obtain zero payoff.  
You have three minutes to make a decision for each trial. 
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